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VI

The Appellant, Joseph Tomlinson, by and through his counsel of record, submits
this Brief in accordance with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.

JURISDICTION.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES.
A.

Issue # 1

Did the district court err by granting summary judgment on Tomlinson's warranty
claims even though the defects giving rise to the claims were not discovered by
Tomlinson during the one-year warranty contained in the Construction Agreement: Cost
Plus Contractor's Fee (the "Construction Agreement"), and the Construction Agreement
did not expressly include a requirement that defects must be discovered during this oneyear period to be actionable? See Construction Agreement, R. at 5832, Addendum 1;
Order 3-4, Jan. 29, 2015, R. at 5482-83, Addendum 2. Tomlinson preserved this issue for
appeal. See Opp'n 37-41, Oct. 29, 2014, R. at 4724-28.

Standard of Review: This Court reviews the district court's ruling on summary
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Tomlinson. See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23,

~

18, 232 P.3d 486;

Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, ~ 4,239 P.3d 519; Wilkinson v. Washington City,
2010 UT App 56, ~ 5,230 P.3d 136. To the extent the court's ruling is based on a
contract interpretation, this Court reviews the district court's contract interpretation
primarily as a question of law under the correctness standard, and accords the court's
interpretation no particular weight. See Meadow Valley Constrs. Inc. v. State Dep 't of

1

Transp., 2011 UT 35, ~ 63,266 P.3d 671 (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,
716 (Utah 1985)).
B.

Issue # 2

Did the district court err by ruling on summary judgment that the Construction
Agreement required Tomlinson to notify Doug Knight Construction, Inc. ("DKC") of
every defect in the home within the one-year warranty period even though the language
of the Construction Agreement's express warranty did not include such a requirement?
See Construction Agreement, R. at 5832, Addendum 1; Order 3-4, Jan. 29, 2015, R. at
5482-83, Addendum 2. Tomlinson preserved this issue for appeal. See Opp'n 41-45,
Oct. 29,2014, R. at 4728-32.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the district court's ruling on summary
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Tomlinson. See Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ~ 18; Martin, 2010 UT App
216, ~ 4; Wilkinson, 2010 UT App 56, ~ 5. To the extent the court's ruling is based on a
contract interpretation, this Court reviews the district court's contract interpretation
primarily as a question of law under the correctness standard, and accords the court's
interpretation no particular weight. See Meadow Valley Constrs. Inc., 2011 UT 35, ~ 63
(quoting Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716).
C.

Issue # 3

Did the district court err by granting the motion to dismiss filed by DKC and
dismissing Tomlinson's claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and
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workmanlike manner? See Order 3, Nov. 25, 2013, R. at 2537, Addendum 3. Tomlinson
preserved this issue for appeal. See Opp'n 10-14, July 31,2013, R. at 1888-92.

Standard of Review: This Court should affirm the district court's ruling on
DKC's motion to dismiss only if it appears to a certainty that Tomlinson would not be
entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of his claim. See

Heiner v. SJ Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

D.

Issue # 4

Did the district court err when it ruled on summary judgment that Tomlinson had
no viable claims against DKC despite admissible evidence in the record showing that
after Tomlinson purchased the home he obtained an assignment of all the original lot
owner's rights? See Assignment of Claims, R. at 5821-22, Addendum 4; Order 4, June 3,
2015, R. at 6064, Addendum 5. Tomlinson preserved this issue for appeal. See Opp'n
17-26, Feb. 18,2015, R. at 5804-13.

Standard of Review: This Court reviews the district court's ruling on summary
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Tomlinson. See Cabaness, 2010 UT 23,
216,

~

4; Wilkinson, 2010 UT App 56,

~

~

18; Martin, 2010 UT App

5. To the extent the court's ruling is based on a

contract interpretation, this Court reviews the district court's contract interpretation
primarily as a question of law under the correctness standard, and accords the court's
interpretation no particular weight. See Meadow Valley Constrs. Inc., 2011 UT 35,
(quoting Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716).

3

~
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IV.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES &
REGULATIONS.
None.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

The Nature of the Case.

This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court granting
summary judgment in case number 100500668. See Order, June 3, 2015, R. at 6061-65,
Addendum 5. This case involves a dispute over significant construction defects
discovered in a multimillion dollar home built by DKC for a single-purpose entity that
sold the new home to Tomlinson. R. at 5481,6062. On July 29,2010, Tomlinson filed a
complaint against DKC and others. R. at 1-16. Through subsequent rulings on motions
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment filed, the district court dismissed all of
Tomlinson's claims against DKC.

B.

The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.

Tomlinson's claims against DKC included claims for breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied warranties
of the implied warranties of habitability and workmanlike manner. See Third Am.
CompI., R. at 816-833. On November 23,2013, the district court dismissed Tomlinson's
claim for breach of the implied warranties. R. at 2535-40. On January 29,2015, the
district court limited Tomlinson's damages on his claims for breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by granting summary
judgment for DKC. R. at 5480-84. Then, on June 3, 2015, the district court granted
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summary judgment for DKC on those claims. R. at 6081-85. Thereafter, Tomlinson
filed a motion to alter or amend the district court's ruling, which was denied on August
11,2015. R. at 6283-984.

C.

Statement of the Facts.

On August 3,2004, DKC entered into the Construction Agreement with Lot 84
Deer Crossing, LLC ("Lot 84") to build the home on a lot that had been acquired by Lot
84 for development. R. at 5797. In January of2005, Lot 84 assigned its rights under the
Construction Agreement to Outpost Development, Inc. ("Outpost"), a successor entity
whose purpose was to sell the newly constructed home to a buyer who would be the
home's first occupant. R. at 5793; Royce Richards Aff. ~ 7, R. at 5817. On March 17,
2006, Tomlinson offered to purchase the Property from Outpost. R. at 5798. DKC
completed construction of the home while the Tomlinson purchase was pending. R. at
5793. Outpost deeded the home to Tomlinson on May 15, 2006, R. 5536, and a
Certificate of Occupancy was issued on May 17, 2006. R. at 5793.
After signing the real estate purchase contract, but prior to closing, Outpost
disclosed a water leak to Tomlinson that DKC had previously disclosed to Outpost. R. at
818-19. Outpost assured Tomlinson the leak had been fixed. R. at 819. In October of
2006, Tomlinson discovered the water leak had not been fixed and notified both Outpost
and DKC that the home failed to conform to the Construction Agreement and its one-year
express warranty. R. at 4695-96. From October 2006 to May 2007, Outpost and DKC
continually promised Tomlinson they would fix the leak, but were unable or unwilling to
do so. R. at 4696-97.
5

After waiting nearly a full year for Outpost and DKC to fix the leak, Tomlinson
hired Park City Fine Homes in September of 2007 to fix the leak and perform
remediation work on the home. R. at 4698-702. Park City Fine Homes fixed and
remediated damages from the leak, but discovered additional defects in the design,
workmanship, and construction of the home that appeared to have been present since the
completion of construction. R. at 4700.
Tomlinson filed suit in 2010 against DKC, Outpost, and others to recover damages
caused by DKC' s defective construction. R. at 1-16. In January 2011, Outpost asserted
seven cross-claims against DKC. R. at 216-19. Before these claims were resolved,
Outpost filed for bankruptcy in Nevada. R. at 1537. After Outpost declared bankruptcy,
Tomlinson purchased an assignment of all of Outpost's existing and potential causes of
action against DKC from Outpost's bankruptcy trustee. R. at 6062-64. Tomlinson then
filed a Third Amended Complaint asserting claims for breach of the Construction
Agreement as assignee of Outpost. R. at 816-833.
Two provisions of the Construction Agreement are of central importance to this
appeal. Article 9.7 provides the following warranty:
Contractor agrees to extend all manufacturer warranties to Owner.
Contractor does not warrant or in any way guarantee the useful life of any
product used in the construction of the Project, if the produce is a natural
product, including but not limited to logs, timbers, stones, or rocks. . . .
Contractor further warrants the Work as per Utah state code for a period of
one year.
See Construction Agreement, R. at 5832, Addendum 1. Article 9.8 contains the

following damage limitation:
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In no event shall Contractor be liable for special or consequential damages.
Contractor's liability on any claim by Owner arising out of or connected
with this contract, or any obligation resulting therefrom, or from the
manufacture, sale, delivery, installation or use of any materials covered by
this Construction Agreement shall be limited to that which is set forth in the
preceding paragraph.

See id.

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
A.

The Construction Agreement Did Not Impose a Discovery or Notice
Requirement.

The Construction Agreement did not expressly impose a requirement on the owner
to discover and issue notice of a defect within one year in order to obtain warranty
coverage. Consequently, the general contractor who drafted the Construction Agreement
was not entitled to imply a discovery and notice requirement in the Construction
Agreement. The courts are not to write a better contract for a party than the party wrote
for itself, but the district court did just that and ruled that Tomlinson was only allowed to
pursue asserted warranty claims for defects that Tomlinson discovered and specifically
identified during that one-year period. This Court should reverse the district court's
decision and should allow Tomlinson to pursue warranty claims for any defects that
Tomlinson can prove existed during the one-year warranty period.

B.

The Implied Warranty of Habitability Should Apply to All Builders of
New Homes.

Utah law should extend the implied warranty of workmanlike manner and
habitability to builders of new homes regardless of whether those builders are in
contractual privity with the new home buyer. The current requirement of contractual
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privity with the home buyer has triggered a rise in the use of single-purpose LLCs and
corporations to act as residential home developers who contract with a builder to
construct a new home and then sell the new home to a buyer in a manner that keeps the
builder at arm's length from the buyer. Many other states have already concluded that a
buyer of a new home should be entitled to rely upon the implied warranty regardless of
whether the builder is in contractual privity with that builder, and the time has come for
Utah to join those states.

C.

Tomlinson Has the Right to Pursue Any Claims that Outpost Could
Have Pursued.

Tomlinson should be allowed to assert warranty claims in the shoes of Outpost
regardless of whether Outpost sold the home during the warranty period. Tomlinson
acquired Outpost's warranty rights by way of assignment after Outpost declared
bankruptcy, and Tomlinson is therefore entitled to assert any claim against DKC that
Outpost itself could have asserted at any time during the course of Outpost's ownership
of the property.

VII.

ARGUMENTS.
A.

TOMLINSON SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN
WARRANTY CLAIMS FOR ANY DEFECTS THAT ACTUALLY
EXISTED DURING THE ONE-YEAR WARRANTY PERIOD
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER TOMLINSON DISCOVERED
THOSE DEFECTS AT A LATER DATE.

The district court made two rulings of law in its January 29 th Order. First, the
court ruled that Tomlinson's claims were limited to those for breach of warranty; and
second, that Tomlinson's claims were limited to those actually discovered and noticed to
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DKC during the warranty period. See Order 3-4, Jan. 29, 2015, R. at 5482-83,
Addendum 2. The court construed § 9.7 and § 9.8 of the Construction Agreement as
barring Tomlinson from asserting any defect claims against DKC that were not brought
to DKC's attention during the first year after completion of construction. See id. The
court ruled that "any claims for contractual defects or construction defects not raised with
the contractor DKC within one year of substantial completion are indeed waived." See
id. at 4, R. at 5483, Addendum 2. This was reversible error because the court improperly

inferred a discovery and notice requirement into the Construction Agreement when no
such requirement was articulated in the Construction Agreement.
When interpreting a contract, a court reviews its language to determine its
meaning and the parties' intentions. See Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC,
2009 UT 27, ~ 25,207 P.3d 1235. If its language is unambiguous, the parties' intentions
are determined from the plain meaning of the contract's language and the contract is
interpreted as a matter oflaw. See id. When interpreting a particular provision in a
contract, that contract provision is considered in relation to all others, "with a view
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." See id.
Turning to the interpretation of the warranty provision in the Construction
Agreement, Tomlinson acknowledges that Utah law requires the courts to enforce a
warranty's discovery and notice requirements when those requirements are actually
articulated in the warranty. See, e.g., Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P.2d
130, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (in which warranty included specific notice requirement).
However, the warranty in the present case only states "Contractor further warrants the
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Work as per Utah state code for a period of one year." See Construction Agreement
§ 9.8, R. at 5832, Addendum 1. But in this case, the builder who wrote the warranty
chose not to impose a notice or discovery requirement upon the property owner. See id.

It does not appear that Utah has previously addressed the question of whether
discovery and notice is implied when a warranty fails to require discovery and notice.
But there is some authority from outside Utah in which a warranty has been found to
cover defects that existed during the one-year warranty period, regardless of whether
those defects were discovered during that same one-year period. See, e.g., Northeastern

Power Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 13437, *15-17 (B.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1999) ("BDI's
warranty does not contain any language which explicitly specifies that the defect must be
'found' or 'discovered' during the one-year period.... We find that a reasonable
interpretation ofBDI's express warranty's language would allow for coverage of
manifest but undiscovered defects due to the fault of the seller."). There are also many
examples of other jurisdictions construing manufacturing warranties in this manner. See,

e.g., Alberti v. General Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D.D.C. 1985) ("It was at
the time of the sales, therefore, that plaintiffs maintain the loss for which they make claim
here-diminished value of the cars they purchased-was incurred, for it was then that
GM broke its warranty that the brakes would function safely ...."); Lidstrand v.

Silvercrest Indus., 623 P.2d 710,714 (Wn. Ct. App. 1999) ("[1]t maybe reasonably
inferred that the defects which became apparent after the l-year period were related to
and caused by the same defects which existed at the time the mobile home was
manufactured."); Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 973 F.2d 988,992 (lst

10

Cir. 1992) ("[F]or purposes of this warranty, a defect 'appears' during the warranty
period if either 1) it is in fact perceived during that period, or 2) it would have been
perceived during the course of an inspection that a reasonable user would normally have
made during that period."); In re Repco Products Corp., 100 B.R. 184, 194 (E.D. Pa.
1989) ("The existence of a malfunction alone establishes a 'defective condition," and it is
not necessary for the buyer to establish a specific defect or the reason why the good did
not properly perform in order to succeed in a breach of warranty claim.").

In Utah, the law recognizes that the construction of a new home is a complex
undertaking, and that the end user of that new home is simply not equipped to assess the
quality of the home received. See Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass 'n v.
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, ~~ 12, 63,221 P.3d 234. Utah law

also recognizes that home builders are in a superior position to comply with the complex
governmental codes and regulations, are in the better position to prevent the harm of
noncompliance, and should bear the loss of any defects. See id.
This recognition of the new home buyer's lack of expertise in home construction
argues in favor of construing builder warranties against the builder and in favor of the
home buyer. If a home buyer is required to discover all defects in a home prior to the
expiration of the builder's warranty, that home buyer owner must hire professionals and
essentially conduct a forensic audit of the home's condition prior to the one-year deadline
or face the loss of the warranty's protection. An ordinary home buyer will never think to
undertake such a forensic audit unless, at the very least, the home buyer is explicitly
warned in the contract or construction agreement ofthe need to do so. Consequently,
11

when a builder fails to issue that warning, the home buyer should not be the one who
suffers.
In Utah, it is well-settled that the court will not write a better contract for a party

than it wrote for itself. See Hillcrest Inv. Co., LLC v. DOT, 2015 UT App 140, , 19, 352
P.3d 128 (citing Ted. R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964,970 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) ("[A] court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have
made for themselves ...."). But that is actually what the district court did in this case.
The district court rewrote the warranty provision of the Construction Agreement to give
DKC more protection than DKC gave itself. Tomlinson asks this Court to hold that the
warranty expressed in § 9.7 and § 9.8 of the Construction Agreement did not impose an
affirmative obligation on Tomlinson to discover and notice a defect within one year of
construction completion. So long as Tomlinson can prove that a defect existed during the
one-year warranty period, he should be allowed to recover damages for that defect.

B.

UTAH LAW SHOULD EXTEND THE AN IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF WORKMANLIKE MANNER AND HABITABILITY TO A
BUILDER OF A NEW RESIDENCE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
THAT BUILDER IS THE SELLER OF THE RESIDENCE OR IN
PRIVITY WITH THE NEW HOME BUYER.

Utah has recently decided to begin recognizing and extending the implied
warranty of workmanlike manner and habitability to the construction of new homes.
Back in 1996, the Utah Supreme Court declined to recognize an implied warranty of
workmanlike manner and habitability (the "implied warranty") in new homes. See Am.

Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). But then in
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2009, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an implied warranty was needed to
prevent "unscrupulous, fly-by-night, [and] unskilled builder[s]" from constructing new
homes. See Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, ~ 53 (quoting Capra v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 321,323
(Ala. 1979)).
Davencourt opened the door to applying the implied warranty to new home
construction in Utah; however, Davencourt did not open the door wide enough to cover
situations where a custom-home "developer"-which is usually a single purpose limited
liability company that is formed to purchase a single lot and then contract with a builder
to construct a single residence for quick sale-employs a builder at arm's length to
construct the new home. In that situation, the LLC sells the home to the actual first
occupant of the home and then distributes the proceeds to its members as quickly as
possible. The LLC is then either dissolved or is left as an empty shell. In that
increasingly common scenario, Utah's implied warranty is useless to the actual home
buyer because the LLC is inherently judgment proof and the "unscrupulous, fly-by-night,
unskilled builder" is at arm's length from the actual home buyer. See id. ~ 53.
This result does not comport with the policies articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court in Davencourt. The Davencourt Court grounded its recognition of an implied
warranty in the following policy considerations:
(1)
(2)
(3)

modern construction is too complex and intertwined with codes and
regulations for the new home buyer to understand;
building a new home is a daily event for contractors who should
know and comply with the codes and regulations;
buyers need be able to rely on a contractor's specialized knowledge
and skill;
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(4)
(5)
(6)

the contractor is in the better position to prevent, notice, and correct
any harm and ought to bear the loss,
unskilled contractors will not perform work and there will be less
defective work; and
purchasing a new home is a significant financial transaction for a
new home buyer and it would be unjust to favor the builder over the
buyer by applying caveat emptor to the sale of the new home.

See Davencourt, 2009 UT 65,

~

53. These policy considerations confirm that the purpose

underlying Utah's implied warranty is to prevent the manifest injustice of imposing
caveat emptor upon a new home buyer who is usually at a distinct disadvantage in
grasping the complexities of modem home construction. See Davencourt, 2009 UT 65,
~~

53-54.
Unfortunately, Davencourt limited the implied warranty to builder-vendors or

developer-vendors, see id. ~ 60, and to parties who are in privity of contract. See id. ~ 54.
These limitations on the implied warranty of habitability have led entrepreneurial
custom-home developers to use single purpose, quick-flip LLCs or S corporations to act
as the developer-vendor. The single-purpose entity is booted up to purchase a bare lot
and hire a contractor to build a house on that lot. The entity then quickly sells the
developed lot for a profit and just as quickly distributes the sale proceeds to its
member(s), who then immediately dissolve the LLC or convert it into an empty shell. If
a homebuyer then asserts a claim against the entity, the entity is thrown into bankruptcy
and the home buyer is left with no other recourse. This arrangement results in rendering
the implied warranty of habitability completely useless to the home buyer, i.e., the very
consumer that the Davencourt Court sought to protect.
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By extending the implied warranty to the actual builder, i.e. the party that is really
described by Davencourt as being the party who should be liable, the policies underlying
Utah's implied warranty will be better served. Many states have already recognized that
removing the vendor and privity requirements is necessary to allow the implied warranty
of habitability to serve its intended purpose. For instance, the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded over 30 years ago:
We can see no difference between a builder or contractor who undertakes
construction of a home and a builder-developer [i.e., builder-vendor]. To
the buyer of a home the same considerations are present, no matter whether
a builder constructs a residence on the land of the owner or whether the
builder constructs a habitation on land he is developing and selling the
residential structures as part of a package including the land. It is the
structure and all its intricate components and related facilities that are the
subject matter of the implied warranty. Those who hold themselves out as
builders must be just as accountable for the workmanship that goes into a
home that a buyer or his successor or successors in interest expect to
occupy in the years that thereafter follow, as are builder-developers.
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 600 P.2d 733,735 (Wyo. 1979). Idaho reached the same

conclusion 10 years later. See Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022, 1033 (Idaho 1987)
(quoting Moxley, 600 P.2d at 735).
In 2008, Arizona discarded the distinction between vendor and contractor after
recognizing that it is the builder who impliedly warrants the new home rather than the
vendor. See The Lofts at Fillmore v. Reliance Commercial Constr., Inc., 190 P.3d 733,
736 (Ariz. 2008); see also FlagstaffAffordable Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. Design Alliance, Inc.,
223 P.3d 664 (Ariz. 2010). The Arizona Supreme Court recognized at that time:
In today's marketplace, as this case illustrates, there has been some shift

from the traditional builder-vendor model to arrangements under which a
construction entity builds the homes and a sales entity markets them to the
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public. In some cases, the builder may be relate to the vendor; in other
cases, the vendor and the builder may be unrelated. But whatever the
commercial utility of such contractual arrangement, they should not affect
the homebuyer's ability to enforce the implied warranty against the builder.
Innocent buyer of defectively constructed homes should not be denied
redress on the implied warranty simply because of the form of the business
deal chosen by the builder and vendor.

Lofts at Fillmore, 190 P.3d at 736.

In 2010, Illinois also extinguished the "vendor requirement" when applying the
implied warranty doctrine to builders of new homes. See 1324 W Pratt Condo. Ass 'n v.

Platt Constr. Group, 936 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2010). After first
recognizing that the implied warranty of habitability has been greatly expanded in recent
years, the Illinois Appellate Court went on to conclude that
limiting application of the warranty to only those builders who are also
vendors would defeat the warranty's policy goals of holding builders
themselves accountable for latent defects in new homes and placing the
costs of repair on the builders who created the defect.

Id.
States have also abandoned the privity requirement when applying the implied
warranty to subsequent purchasers. See Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assocs., 727 A.2d
174, 179-81 (R.I. 1999); Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290,293-94 (N.H. 1988); Sewell

v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82,85 (W. Va. 1988); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022,
1033, 1035-36 (Idaho 1987); Aronsohn v. Mandara, 484 A.2d 675,680 (N.I 1984);

Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427,430 (Ariz. 1984); Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983); Keyes v. Guy Baily Homes, Inc., 439 So.
2d 670, 672-73 (Miss. 1983); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330-31 (Ill.
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1982); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321,323-24 (Ark. 1981); Elden v. Simmons,
631 P.2d 739, 742 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769-770 (S.C. 1980);

Moxly v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. MacBrown,
342 N.E.2d 619,620-21 (Ind. 1976); see generally Annotation, Liability ofBuilder-

Vendor or Other Vendor ofNew Dwellingfor Loss, Injury, or Damage Occasioned by
Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383, passim (2015). The rationale policy
underlying the decision by these states to lift the privity requirement was summed up by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey as follows: "To require privity between the contractor
and the home owner in such a situation would defeat the purpose of the implied warranty
of good workmanship and could leave innocent homeowners without remedy ...."

Aronsohn, 484 A.2d at 680.
In the present case, the district court dismissed Tomlinson's implied warranty
claim because DKC was not the actual seller of the new home. See Order 3, Nov. 25,
2013, R. at 2537, Addendum 3. While it is true that the district court's decision complies
with Davencourt, Tomlinson is asking Utah to lift the vendor and privity requirements set
forth in Davencourt. Unless and until the vendor and privity restrictions are removed
from Utah's implied warranty of habitability, contractors like DKC who build defective
homes will be able to escape all liability for their defective work, and equally
unscrupulous entrepreneurial "developers" will be able to use single-purpose LLCs to
render the implied warranty useless to purchasers of new homes.
Tomlinson recognizes that this Court may be constrained in granting the relief
requested by Tomlinson because this Court "cannot disregard or overturn decisions of the
17

Supreme Court." State v. Horrocks, 2001 VT App 4,

'J 24,

17 P.3d 1145. But Tomlinson

must argue to this Court in order to preserve his rights to ultimately put these issues
before the Utah Supreme Court.

C.

TOMLINSON SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ASSERT WARRANTY
CLAIMS AGAINST DKC FOR ANY WARRANTY ISSUE THAT
EXISTED WHEN OUTPOST OWNED THE HOME.

The district court ruled on June 3, 2015 that "the only remaining claims Plaintiff
has alleged against DKC in this case are breach of contract claims for construction
defects, and these claims are 'pass through' claims brought by Plaintiff as an assignee of
Outpost's contract claims." See Order 4, June 3, 2015, R. at 6064, Addendum 5. In
reality, Tomlinson did assert direct claims against DKC as well as pass-through claims.

See Third Am. Compl, 7-8, R. at 822-23. But Tomlinson also asserted claims against
DKC in the shoes of Outpost. See Opp'n 17-23, R. at 5804-10.
With regards to Outpost's assignment of its warranty rights, DKC did not limit the
warranty's transferability. See Order 3, Jan. 29, 2015 (quoting Construction Agreement
6, § 9.8), R. at 5482, Addendum 2. DKC simply provided that it would warranty "the
Work ... for a period of one year." See id. Tomlinson acquired "all of Outpost's right
title and interest in and to any and all rights, claims, causes of action, choses in action,
rights to payments, and judgment of any kind that Outpost has asserted in the Litigation,
or may otherwise assert, against the Defendants (the 'Claims')." See Assignment of
Claims, Addendum 4; Opp'n 18, R. at 5805. Given the unrestricted terms of the
warranty, Tomlinson can properly enforce the warranty, as the assignee of the warranty
right.
18

The district court limited Tomlinson's damages to those actually suffered by
Outpost prior to the assignment. See Order 4, June 3, 2015 (relying on SME Indus., Inc.

v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ~ 30,28 P.3d 669, in
making its ruling), R. at 6064, Addendum 5. The district court's rulings were made in
error because SME Industries, Inc. does "not place a temporal restriction on the damages
an assignee may recover." See Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2010 UT 6, ~
25,230 P.3d 1000. In Sunridge, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that:
[T]he rule that an assignee cannot stand in a better position than its assignor
simply means an assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could
have recovered under the assigned contracts. The correct inquiry looks at
the assignor's rights and liability under the contract, not solely whether a
claim for damages arose before or after the date of the assignment.

See id. ~ 23 & n.5 (emphasis added). According to Sunridge, Tomlinson has the right to
assert any claims that Outpost could have pursued, not merely claims that Outpost did
pursue.

VIII. CONCLUSION.
Tomlinson purchased a home that was under construction when he signed the
purchase contract. After closing on the purchase, Tomlinson discovered significant
defects in the construction of the home that were in existence as of the home's
completion. Because the general contractor who built the home had issued a one-year
builder's warranty to the seller of the home, and because Tomlinson acquired an
assignment of the seller's rights under that warranty, Tomlinson should be allowed to
pursue breach of warranty claims against the builder for any defects that Tomlinson can
prove were in existence during the one-year builder's warranty period. The district court
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erred when it injected a discovery and notice requirement into the warranty provision of
the Construction Agreement, and the district court erred when it ruled that Tomlinson
was not entitled to pursue claims in the shoes of the seller of the home that the seller did
not itself pursue prior to the sale of the home to Tomlinson.
The business arrangement employed by the developer of the home in this case is
an increasingly common one in the State of Utah. A single-purpose entity is formed to
acquire a lot and then that entity arranges for a third-party builder to construct a new
home on the lot. The developer entity then sells the new home to buyers like Tomlinson
and the seller entity converts itself into an empty shell. Because Utah currently requires a
home buyer to be in privity with the builder in order to be covered by the implied
warranty of habitability, the buyer is unable to invoke the implied warranty of habitability
against the builder when the home turns out to be uninhabitable. In order for this to
change, the vendor and privity requirements imposed by Davencourt must be lifted so
that all builders of new homes are subject to the implied warranty of habitability and
workmanlike manner.
Tomlinson requests this Court to: (1) reverse the court's November 23,2013
Order that dismissed Tomlinson's claim for breach of the implied warranties, (2) reverse
the court's January 29,2015 Order that limited Tomlinson's damages on his claims for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
granting summary judgment for DKC, and (3) reverse the court's June 3, 2015 Order that
granted summary judgment for DKC on those claims.
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IX.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Tomlinson respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal.
DATED December 4,2015.
WRONA, GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 1: Construction Agreement

.,
•

,
I

CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT

COST PLUS CONTRACTOR'S FEE
This agreement Is made and entered Into this 21st day of JUly, ,2004, batween Douglas Knight
Construction, lno, with offIces Illt 1434 East 4600 SQuth #103 Salt Lake CUy UT 84117
("Conlraotor"), and 'Lot 84 Deer Crossing, LLC ("Owner"), whose present address Is 0/0 Royce
RIchards, Manager, '2490 WallAve., Ogden UT 84401 ("Owner").
.
For and In consideratIon of the agreements and covenants set forth herein, and other good and
valuable consideration, the racelpt and suftlolency of which Is Mreby acknowledged, Contraotor
and OWner agree asfollows:
ARTiCLE 1
PROJECT ANO THEWORK
1.1

The, conetructlcn proJeot subject to this agreement (the "Work") Is located at the address
described as Lot84 Deer Crossing, Promontory SUbdivIsion, Summit County, Utah.

1.2'

The Contraotor shall perform all the Work reasonably required, neoessary or appropriate '
to construct the project forthe Owner.

1.3

this Work Is described more fully In, but not limited to, the construction drawings,
Identified In Article 3 hereof, and lncludes any eddlilonal work requested or approved by
the Owner, agreed to by the Contractor, whether oral or In writing. If oral, the Work shall
bedescribed In Change 'Orders, eubsequent to the oral agreement.
ARTICLE 2
TIME

2.1

The Work to be performed under this contraot shall be commenced no earlier than when
the Contractor has received the building permit and completed working drawings and
speolflcatlons, subject to authol'lzed adjustments. Thedate of commencement is thedate
on which the Contractor has received the bUllrHng permit and completed drawings and'
specifications. .

2,2

SUbstantial completion sh{3.11 be achleved not later than 13 months following the date of
commencement, This date shall be extended' for delays- tl1Elt are not caused by
Contractor, Including but notlimited to:changes ordered In the Worl<, failure of Owner to
make Selections or to otherwlse perform owner's responsibilities under this contract.
labor disputes, fire, delays In traneportaton, adverse weather conditions not reasonably
entlclpated, unavoidable, casualties, or any cause beyond' the Contractor's control, whIch
mayjusttfy the delay. In aooordance with anyof the above, the time for oomrnenoernent
and cornpletlon of the Work shall be extended for a reasonable time.

2.3

Substantial completion Is defined aswhen oonstructlon ls sufficiently complete 60 that the
Owner can occupy or utilize the Project for the purpose for whioh It Is Intended. Owner
ma~1 take possession of the Project after SubstantIal Completion at a time agreed to by
theparties.

2.4

In the event comractor does not achieve Substantial Completion wIthin the Contract
TIme, Including approved extenslons, the Contractor shall pay the Owner,
liquidated
damages and not as a penaity, the sum of $100.00 per each work day the 8ctuE11 time
performance exoeeds ' the aufhorlzed Contract Time, if Owner has completed all

as
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selectlons prior to the beginning of the framing phase of the home. Owner hereby
e.cl<nowledgas thata blank Selection Sheet hasbeen provided Owner by contractor,
ARrICLE:3
CONTI'{AOT DOCUMENTS
3.1

The ccntract documents consist of this Agreement and any written, appended, and
Initialed or signed aitaohmente, exhibits and addenda; theInitialed or signed drawIngs; the
written, l'nltialed, or signed speolflcatlons; the documents speclflcaIly enumerated below;
and all oral, written. Initialed, or signed modifications and change orders tseued by the
Owner or Owner's architect, after execution of the Agreement for minor changes In the
Work. Contract documents Include:

Arohlteotural Plans by Jack Johnson company

Date: June9,2004

Pages lncluded:
Aa
Cover Sheet
L-1
GradIng Plan
A1 00
Basement F'loor Plan
A101
. Ground Level Floor Plan
Ai 02
Second Lev-al Floor Plan
Ai03
Roof pran
A200-2D1
Exterior Elevattons
A300
Building Sections
A400·402
WaH Seotlons
A500·501
Enlarged Slalr Plans and·Seclions
MOO
Details
A70a
Door and Window Schedull;l
A7a1
Door andWindow Details
ABOO"817
Interlor Elevations
A900
Lower Level Reflected CeIling Plan.
AS01
GrOund Level Reflected Ceiling Plan
A902·
Second Level Reflected Cellfn9 Plan
81.1
General structural Notes
81.2
Standard Detalls•.Abbrevlatlons & Symbols
82.1
Basement Foundation Plan
82.2
Foundation Plan
83.1
Foundation Delalls
84,1
Basement Framing PJan
84.2
Floor and Low Roof Framll1g Plan
S4.3
Roof Framing PII\1I1
85.1-5.3
Framing Details
At thetIme of the Estimate, no Soils Report was available for the ProJeot.
ARTICLE 4
CONTRACTOR'S FEE

4.1

In conelderaton for the performance of the Worl< on the ProJect, the Owner agrees to pay
the Contractor In current funds as compensation for the Contractor's services on the
Projeot asfollows:

4.2

Owner agrees to relmburse Contractor all costs of the Work as set forth in Article 5
hereof.
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4.3'

Owner agrees to pay a comraotcr'e fee (the "Contractor's Fee"), In addition to
reimbursement of all costs' of the Work, ~$ setforth InArticle 5 hereof. Suoh Contractor's
Fee shall be It1 the amount of $149,900, and shall be paid In a pro rata share of 9.92% of
the hard costs by Owner with each draw, up to a total amount of $149,900. At the
oompletlon of the ProJect, anyunpaId balance of the $149,900 shall be paid Infullwith the
lastdraw to the connecter.

4.4' Contractor Includes an Estimate Report for the conatructlon costwith this Contraot. The
Estimate Report Is provided to give the owner an approxlmatlon of what the Worl< would
cost as per the plans and specs at the time of the Estimate. Coste mayvary from the
Estlmate' Report due to materials, cost ohanges, or scope of work changes.
ARTICLE 5
COSTS TO BE REIMBURSeO

5.1

Reimbursable coats shall mean costs necessarily incurred by Contraotor In the
performance of the Work. The Owner shall reimburse the Contractor for all of the costs
of theWork, which costs shall InclUde, but are not limited to, the cost Items hereinafter
identified In this Article 5, that. are incurred In the proper performance of the Work, and
either paid for or payable by the· cornraotor, Such costs shall be at rates not higher than
those customarily paid, except by consent of the owner,
Contractor will undertake bestefforts to see that Work is performed at the costs setforth
in the cost breakdown contained In the Standard Estimating Report and use all dlIigenc$
to hold subcontractora to the blds sUbmItted therein.
a.

Wages paid for labor Inthe direct employ of the Contractor inclUding Oontraotor'a
supervisory and admlnlstl'ative personnel when working on til is project.

b.

Cost of all materials, supplies and equipment Incorporated IntheWork performed
pursuant to the agreement or subcontracts pursuant hereto. The bid costs for
construction supplies (lnoludlng but not limited to lumber and sheetrock) Is an
estimate only. It Is not a firm bid. The aotual costs for materials and supplies
may bemore or less at the time of purchase, The.owner shall be responsible for
theaotual costof such construction .supplles,
Payments made by th~ Oontraotor to subconfractors for work performed pursuant
to SUbcontracts or subcontractors.
Cost of all materials, supplies, eqUIpment, temporary facilities (InclUding heat and
other uUlltl'ss) and hand tools not owned by the' workers, whioh are consumed or
damaged Inthe performance of the Worl<.
Reasonable rental costs of all neceseery machinery and equipment, exclusive of
hand tools, used at 'the site of the Work, Whether rented from the confraotor or
others.
Cost of premiums for all bonds end Insurance, permlt fees, end sales, use or .
smllar taxes related to ihe Work even if not listed In any Estimating StElndard
Report included 11'1 theOontraot documents.
Losses and expanses not-compensated by insurance or otherwise, sustained by
the Contractor In connection with the Wotl~, provided they have resulted from
causes other thl.'lli thefault or I}eglect ofthe Contractor.
Costof removal of alldebris.
Costs lncurred dueto an emergency affecting the safety of persona or property.
Other costs lnourred in the performance of the Work if and to the extent required
or approved orany or II) writing by the owner, or deemed necessary by the
Contractor or archltect,

c.

d.

e.
f.
g.
h.
L

3

005829

.

. ".

J.
k..
I.

m.

5.2

Sales, use or sImilar taxes Imposed by a governmental authority which are
related to theWorl< and forwhIch the contractor Is liable,
Fees and assessments for the buildIng permlt and for other permits, licenses,
tests and Inspections for whloh the contractor Is required by to payIn connectlon
with the performance of thiscontract.
Necessary costs and expenses as per the cost breakdown In any Estlmatlflg
Standard Report Included IntI,eContract documents.
All ooets and expenses associated with selemlo tie down reqLllrements notshown
on the plans, unforeseen water tables, unstable ground, rook blasting,
contfngl'lhetas related to adverse weather condltlons or delays, or any other '
extraordinary geographical or geophysical conditions which are not known bythe
oontrectcr,

I
j
'I

J
I

'!

'The following costs are not to be reimbursed: Contractors genera! overhead, office rent,
and general overhead oosts not directly attributed to thIs job.

ARTIOlE 6
PAYMENTSTOTHEOONTRACTOR
6.1

'Owner shall'make bl-monthly progress payments to the Contractor within five days of the
Owner's receipt of Contractor's appJlcatlon for payment as follows:
a.

With each applicaton, Oontractor shalt submIt a oOPY of each voucher, Invoice,
receipt and otherdocuments reasonably necessary to authentloets the 0081s (as
provided InArticle 5)for which payment is requested.

b.

With each payment by Owner or Owner's lender for costs, the Contractor shall
simUltaneously be paid an amount equal to 9.92% of the costs, which amounts
shall be In partial payment of and shall be applied against the Contractor's Fee
set forth InArticle 5 hereof.

6.2

Payment due and unpaid under this Agreement shall bearInterest from the date payment
is dus at therate of 1B% per annum.

6.3

Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of the cost of the Work'and of the
Contractor's Fee, unless otherwise agreed in wrlllng, shall by paid by the Owner to the
Contractor withIn ten (10) days aftersubstantial cornpletlon of the Worl<, butin l'lll events
not later than the time of Owner's taking possession or oooupanoy of the building subject
to theWork.

6.4

The making of final payment and completion of corrected work referenced In Article 13
ehaliconeflnrte a waiver of all claims by the Owner with the exoeptlon of claims In Article
9. The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all claims by the
Contractor except those prev!'ously made In writing and Identified by the Contractor as
unsettled at the time of final application for payment, with the exception of tnvolces by
subcontractors or suppliers noltoreseen by Contractor.
ARTICLE?
CHANGES IN THE WORK

7.1

All Owner seleotlona, including colors, specifications, and materials, shall be made 110
later than two weeks before commencement of framing, or such wltl be treated as a
ohanpe,

7.2

The Owner, wIthout invalidatrng thisAgreement, may, with consent and agreement of the
Contractor, approve or request changes In the Worl{ afterSelections are made. It Is the
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Owner's or Owner's agents' responsibility to supply all necessary documentation,
specifications, and drawings so that said changes can be accurately estlmated and
pertormsd, The cost of any' such change to the Work shall be in~luded In the
relmbureable costs and f$$s, TheWorkand theTimefor Contractor's performance and
completion of the Work, In ArtlclGi 2, shall be adjusted for each such requested ohange,
Such changes In the Work must be authorized In writing signed by the Owner and
Contractor.

!
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ARTiCLE 8
OWNER

"

~
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8.1

Owner' shall Issue all communications concerning the work to be performed under this
contract directly to the Contractor or Architect. Owner shall not Impede or endeavor to
supervise the oonstructon work to be performed under or arising out of thls contract,
Should Owner Impede supervise, or effect changes In the work requIred by the Contract
documents contrary to th1a paragraph, Owner shall be liable and rssponslble therefore to
sUch Indlvlduats, SUbcontractors and the Contractor, or each of them, for all costs,
damages and Injuries of every nature arising directlY or Indirectly as a result of Owner's
activities or ohanges affected In thework.

8.2

Owner shall make all seleotlona and forward all Instructions to the Contractor or Architect
In a timely manner so as notto delay theproject.

8.3

Owner shall waive clalrns against Contractor for consequential damages arising out of or
relatrng to the performance of this agreement which shall Inolude but not be limited to
damages Incurred by Owner for rental expenses, loss of use of income, lost profits, and
flnanoing costs, Interest and fees.

il

j

~

"j

ARtiCLE o
CONTRACTOR

9.1 ,

Except as may be provIded [n Article 8, the contractor shall secure and pay for
necessary approvals, easements, aeseaaments and charges required for the
oonstruotlon, use or cccupanoy of permanent structures ·or permanent changes In
existing facilities,

9.2

the contractor shClII perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents,
using Contractor's bestskill and attention, and the Contractor shall be solely responsible
for all consfrucnon means, methods, 'techniques, sequences and procedures and for
ooordinating all portions- ofthe Work under thisAgreement.

9,3

Except as provided In Ali/ole 5, the Contractor shall provlde and pay 'For all labor,
materlals, equipment, tools, conetruotlon equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilltles,
transportation, and otherfacilities and servlces necessary for the proper execution and
completion of the Worl<, whether temporary or permanent, and whether or not
lnccrporated In theWork, and Owner shall reimburse connactor for the same,

9A

Contractor Is responslble to provide Owner with Hen releases for any and all work or
supplies, utilized on saidjob.

9.5

Except as provided in Article 5, the Oontractor shall pay all sales, consumer, use and
other similar taxes which are legally In force at the time bids are received, and shall
secure and payfor the buUdlng permit and for all other perm'lts and governmlilntaJ fees,
llcenaea and Inspections necessary for the proper exeoutlon and oompledon of theWork,
and Owner shall reimburse tl16 Contractor for the same.
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9,6

As reasonably praotloable under the clrcumstanoes, the contractor shall keep the
premlaes free from unreasonable acoumulatlon of Wlil$te materials or rubbish caused by
the Contractor's operatlons, At the completion of theWork, the Contraotor shell remove
all such waste materials and rubbish from and about the project, as well as the
Contractor's tools, oonstructlon equipment, machinery and surplus" materials,

9.7

Limited Warranty: Contractor agrees to extend ell manufacturer warranties to Owner,
Conu'actor doesnotwarrant or In any way guarantee the useful life of anyproduct used
In the oonstructlon of the Project, If the product Is a natural product, Includlng but not
limited to logs, timbers, stones, or rooks, Contraotor willto thebestof Contraotor's ability
use the best produots possible subject to the estlma1e report and budget. connecter
further warrants the Work asperUtah state code "for 1;1 period of one year.

9.8

In no event shall contractor be liable for special or consequentlal damages. Contraotor's
!lability on any olaim by Owner arIsing out of or connected With this contract, or any
obligation resultIng therefrom, orfrom the manufacture, sale, delivery, InstallatIon or use
of any materials covered by tl~ls agrMment shall be limited to that whJch is set forth tn
the preceding paragraph.

.!

ARTiCLE 10
ACCOUNTJNG RECORDS
10.1 '/ contractor shall keep full and detailed aecounta and exercise such controls as maybe
necessary for proper financial management under thisContract. The Owner and the
Owner's aooountants shall be afforded access to,andshall bepermitted to audit and
copy, the Contractor's records, books, correepondenoe, Instructions, drawings, receipts,
subcontracts, purchase orders, vouchers, memoranda and other data relating to this
Contract, and the Contractor shall preserve these for a period of three years .after final
payment.
ARTICLE 11
RESOLUTION OFOiSPUTES
11.1

INITIAL OISPUTE RESOLUTION. Ifa dlspute arises outof orrelates to thisContract, or
the breach thereof, the parties shall endeavor (0 seUle the dispute firstthrough direct
dlscusslcns. If the dispute cannot be settled thrOUgh dlrect clscusalons, the parties shall
endeavor to settle the dispute bymediation before recourse to arbltrafon, Unless the
partles agree> omerwtse, the mediation shall be ooncucted Inaooordance with the
Construction MedlatJon RUles of theArnerloan Arbitration Assoclatlon. Thetime limits for
anysubsequent arbitration wfll be sxtended forthe duration of themediation process
plus fourteen (14) calendar days, or as otherwIse provided in the Contract Doouments. If
parties can't resolve thedisputes through medIation the parties shall arbitrate,

11.2

AGREEMENTTO ARBITRATE. All claims, disputes and other rnattere In question
arising out of,or relating to, thisContract, orths breach 1hereof, except for claims which
have been waived by the makIng or acoeptenoe of final payment, shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with [he Ocnsfruotlon Industry Arbitration Rules of theArnerloan
AI'bitration Association then In effect unless ihe parties mutually agrae otherwise.
Notwithstanding other provisions Inthis Contract, or oholce of law provlslons to the
contrary, thisagreement to arbitrate ahall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Aot, 9
U.S.C. § 1 §§ftg,., which shall notbe superseded orsupplemented by anyother
at'bltratlon act, statute l or regulation. Theaward of the arbltrator(s) Shall befinal andmay
be enforced In anycourt of competent jurlsdlotlon, Theprevailing party In such arbitration
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proceedIngs shall be entItled to an award of Itsattorney's fees, and Jls costs Inourred
includIng arbitrators feesand costs, administrative fees and expert fees.
11.3

WORK CONTINUATION AND PAYMENT, The Contraotor shall carryonthe Contract
Workand maintain the Schedule ofWorkpending final resolution of a claim Including
arbitration, unless the Contract has been tel'fI1lnated or the Contract Work-suspended as
provided for in theContract, or the parties otherwise ~gree Inwriting to a partial or total
suspension of the Contract Work, If the Subcontractor Iscontinuing to perform In
aooordance With theContract, the connector shall continue to make payments as
required by the Contract.
-

11.4

NO L1MIl'ATION OFRIGHTS AND REMEDIES, Nothing InthisArticle shall limitany
rights or remedies notexpressly waived bytheContractor which the Contractor mayhave
under lienlaws or surety bonds,

11.5

SAME ARBITRA'fORS. To the extent not prohibited by their contracts. with others, the
olalms and disputes of the Owner, Contractor and others Involved with the Project,
concerning a common queston cffact or law, shall be heard bythesame arbitrator(s) [n a
single prooeedlng.
ARTICLE 12
INSUMNCE

12.1

Unless otharwlstl provided, the Owner shall purchase and maintain Insl,Iranoe upon the
entire Work at 1he Project site to the fulllnsurabJe value thereof and shall add Contractor
as an additional Insured. This Insuranca shall Include the lntarests of the Owner, the
Oontraotor, and subcontractors of theWork, and shaJllnsure agafnst theperils otftre and
extended coverage and shall Include "sll rlsl\~ insurance for physical 10SB or damage,
Including, without duplication of coverage, theft, vandalism, and malicious mischief, Inthe
event of a claim, the Owner is responslble for payml'lnt of anydeductible.

12,2

Certificates of Insurance acceptable to the Contractor shall be filed with the Contractor
prior to commencement of the Work. The Insurance procured by the Owner shall be
deemed to be primary andshall be looked to firstfor protectlon and coverage matters,

.12.$

Any loss Insured under Paragraph 12.1 is to be adjusted With the Owner and made
payable to the Owner as trustee for the Contractor and other Insureds, SUbject to the
requirements of anymortgagee 011:l1..l8e.

12.4

T.he Owner and the Contractor waive all rights agaInst each other for damaces caused by
fire or other pertls to the extent covered by lnsursnce obtained pursuant to Article. 12 or
anyother property lnsuranoa applloable tothe Work, exoept'suoh rights as they mayhave
. to the proceeds .of such Insurance' held by the Owner as trustee, The Contractor shall
. require similar waivers in favor of the Owner and the Contractor by subcontraotora and
sub-subcontractors.

12.5,

Contractor shall maintain generaillebilily Insurance, covering olarns Which mayarise out
of or result from the Oontractor'a operations under tha Contract, and as specified In the
terms anhe generalliabliity pol!cy,
_
ARTICLE 13
CORRECTION OFWORK

13.1

l'he Owner or Owner's architect shall furnish to the Contractor, at the time of Substantial
CompletIon, a written llst of any work that is Inoomplete" rejected or claimed to be
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defeotlve, or falling to conform to thIs Agreement. otherwise, any such rejection or olalm
Is waived.

13.2

Within a reasonable period of lIma, after receipt of the written list provided for In
Paragraph 13,1 the Contractor shall correct any of the work reasonably and timely
rejeoted by the Owner .or Owner's architect whloh Is defective or falls to conform to this
Agreement.

I

~
J

1

ARTICLE 14
TERMINAilON OFTHE AGREEMENT
14.1

If any payment required to be made to the Contractor under this Agreement Is hof made
Within 20 days of the date required, or If Owner falls to carry out the terms of this
Agreement It, accordance with all ItsProvisions" the confraotor, without limiting or waiving
anyother legal rights or remedies, may at Itssale option, after written notice to the Owner
f1nd three days timeto cure, either terminate this Agreement and retain all amounts paid
under this Agreement, or 'suspend Work until Owner makes sufficient payment. 'Upon
termination, Contractor shall recover from the Owner payment forall work performed and
reimbursement for all costs Inourred, together with tli6 Contractor's Fee equal to 9,92% of
the cost of all Worl~ performed as of the date of termination, as provided 'In Paragraphs
14.2 hereof.
'

14,2

In case of such termihatlon of this Agreement, the Owner shall further assume and
become liable for obligations, commltments and unsettled clalrns that theContr61ctor has
previously undertaken or lnourred In good faith' in connection With said Work. The Owner
shall also pay to the Contractor fair compensation, either by purchase or rental, at the
election of theOwner, for any equipment retainad.
ART1CLE 15
D1PFERING SITE CONDlilONS & ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

15.1

If'conditions are encountered at the site whIch are (1) subsurface or otherwise concealed
physical condlilons which differ materially from thosebdlceted in the contract Documents
or (2) unknown physical conditIons of an unUsual nature, whloh dlffermaterfally from
those ordinarily found to exIst and generally recognIzed as Inherent In construction
actlvltles of the character provided 'for In the Contl'act ooournents, then, and In such
event, Contractor shall beelitltled to receive an extension to the time required to
complete the Work and all costs incurred by Contraotor In connection with all extra work
and time expended.

15,2

Owner anticipates that the slte upon which the prolect ls to be construoted Is freeand
clear of any and all hazardous or regUlated wastes. In the event of such discovery,
Contractor at Itsoption maytermInate this Agreement. If any such item described above
is found, Construction shall stop' Immediately to determine how to correct the problem.
Anycosts to correct theproblem shall bethe Owner.

15:3

Contractor shall be entItled to an adjustment Inthe contract timeInWhich to complete Its
work and ell costs of correction, delay, shut down and startup resulting from or relating to
the Inspeotlon, testing and remov.al of hazardous auhatanoea or malerlals which may
cause foreseeable bodily Injury or death to Contractor's personnel,

15.4

Owner agrees to Indemnify and hold contractor harmless from any Ilabillty associated
with thediscovery, testlno, Inspection or removal of such hazardous substances.

8
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ARTICLE 16
'ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
1'6..1

The laws of theState of Utah shall govern this Agreement.

16.2.

Notices, as required or permitted under this Agreement, shall be In wrlttng, and dellvered
personally or by faosimlle or United states mail, postage prepaid, to 'the parties at the
addresses herelnabove given.
.

16.3

In the event either party to this Agreement defaults In the performance of such party's
covenants or obligations contained hereIn, the prevailing party In any ectlon shall be entitled.
to reimbursement of all reasonable costs and attorney fees Incurred In E:lnforclng this
Agreement or pursuIng Jts rights hereunder Inconjunction with Article 11.

.~

J

I!

l

4

l

j

-'1I

i

16.4

ThJs Agreement sets forth the entire Agreement of the parties with respect to the SUbject
matter hereof. No provision hereof may be amended, nor·any right hereunder waived,
unless agreed Inwriting between the parties hereto.
This Agreement entered lnto as of the day and year first wrftten above.

OWNERfOWNERS
LOT 84 DE:ER CROSSING LLC

saaa
Data:~W

By.:

Date:

~

·

_

_ _-

-

_
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ADDENDUM 2: Order, Jan. 29, 2015

The Order of Court is stated below:
lsi RYA
Dated: January 29, 2015
03:11:15 PM
Distric

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPHTOMLINSON, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS KNIGHTCONSTRUCTION, a
Utah corporation; CLIVEBRIDGEWATER
an individual; BRIDGEWATER
CONSULTING GROUP, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and JOHNDOES 1-10;
Defendants.

ORDERRE:DOUGLASI(NIGHT
CONSTRUCTION, INCo'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
WAIVER

Civil No. 100500668
Judge Ryan Harris

DOUGLAS KNIGHTCONSTRUCTION, a
Utah Corporation;
Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.
AKITA CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
Corporation; HEARTH & HOME
DISTRIBUTORS OF UTAH, LLC, a Utah
LimitedLiabilityCompany, HIGH
MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah Corporation; JACK JOHNSON
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; PCF,INC.
d/b/a PELLA WINDOWS AND DOORS, a
Utah Corporation; PICTUREPERFECT

January 29,201503:11 PM
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STONEMASONRY, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company; ROCKYMOUNTAIN
WATERPROOFING, INC., a Utah
Corporation; SCHULTZ PLUMBING &
HEATING, INC., a Utah Corporation;
SIGNATURE CONCRETE, INC., a Utah
Corporation; SUPERIOR INSULATION
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation; THORNTON
PLUMBING & HEATING, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and U.S. DECK, INC., a
CaliforniaCorporation;
Third-PartyDefendants.

On January 13, 2015,the Court heard arguments on Douglas Knight Construction, Inc.'s ("DKC")
Motion for Summary Judgment re: Waiver. Plaintiffwas represented by Bastiaan K. Coeberghof

Wrona, Gordon & Dubois, PC; DKC was represented by Noah M. Hoaglandof SuitterAxland,
PLLC; and Picture Perfect StoneMasonry as observing party was represented by Gabriel K. White
of Christensen & Jensen.
Based on the Motion and related filings, the arguments of counsel at hearing, and for good cause
shown, the Court herebyORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
Plaintiff Joseph Tomlinson alleges construction defects at his home in Park City, Utah (the
"Home"), which DKC built pursuantto Construction Agreementbetween DKC and Lot 84, LLC.
DKC moved for partial summary judgment claiming that any defect not raised within one year of
substantial completion is barred by the Construction Agreement. Tomlinson opposedDKC's Motion
arguingthat the Construction Agreement imposes no such limitationon breach of contractclaims

January 29, 2015 03:11 PM

and that in any event genuineissues of material fact exist precluding such parsing out of
construction defects.
The Court hereby grantsDKC's Motion in part and enters a ruling as a matter of law on contract
interpretation issues as guidance to the parties.
The Construction Agreement provides in Article 6.4 that "[t]he making of final paymentand
completion of corrected work referenced in Article 13 shall constitute a waiver of all claims by the
Ownerwith the exception of claims in Article9."
Article 9.8 of the Construction Agreement states:
In no event shall Contractor be liable for special 01'
consequential damages. Contractor's liabilityon any claim by
Owner arising out of or connected with this contract, or any
obligation resulting therefrom, or fromthe manufacture, sale,
delivery, installation or use of any materials coveredby this
agreement shall be limitedto that which is set forth in the
preceding paragraph.
The precedingparagraph, Article 9.7 of the Construction AgreementprovidesDKC's limited
warranty:
Contractor agrees to extend all manufacturer warranties
to Owner. Contractor does not warrantor in any way
guarantee the useful life of any productused in the
construction ofthe Project, ifthe produce is a natural product,
including but not limitedto logs, timbers, stones, 01' rocks.
Contractor will to the best of Contractor's abilityuse the best
products possible subjectto the estimate report and budget.
Contractor further warrants the Work as pel'Utah state code.
for a period of one year.
The Court concludes that Article 13 of the Construction Agreementpertainsto punch list work and

January 29,201503:11 PM
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does not preclude any of Plaintiffs claims herein. However, the Court also concludes that Article
9.8, and Article 9.7 are unambiguous and that pursuant to Article 9.7 and 9.8, any claims for
contractual defects or construction defects not raised with the contractor DKC within one year of
substantial completion are indeed waived.
Notwithstanding, the Court is unable to completely determine as a matter of law which defects or
damages claimed by Tomlinson are precluded as a result of its legal ruling as to the interpretation of
Articles 9.7 and 9.8. At oral argument, counsel for DKC used "three categories" as a construct for
dividing claims that would be barred from claims that would not be, and the Court finds these
categories helpful. However, the Court cannot completely determine as a matter of law, based on
the record presented to date, which line-items from Plaintiff's claims fall into which categories.
The categories are roughly described as follows:
Category 1: items that were raised with the contractor within one year of substantial completion.
Tomlinson's claims with regard to these items are, as a matter oflaw, not barred by Section 9.7 or
9.8 of the agreement;
Category 2: other items related to the issues raised within one year. If issues are related to the
matters that were raised within the first year, summary judgment on these items would appear to be
inappropriate; and
Category 3: additional items not related to the Category 1 issues raised within the first year.
Summary judgment on these items would appear to be appropriate.
As noted, the Court cannot completely determine which items fall into which category at this time.

January 29,201503:11 PM

However, certain items were conceded by DKC at oral argument to have been raised within the first
year and therefore to fall within Category 1 (including water intrusion at the exterior fireplace, great
room sliding doors, and the northwest bedroom, adjacent hallway, and north side of the game room
below). Likewise, certain items were conceded by Plaintiffs at oral argument to be completely
unrelated to any Category 1 issues, and therefore to fall within Category 3 (including the kitchen
crawl space and the radiant heating system).

As to these two conceded issues only (the kitchen

crawl space and the radiant heating system), summary judgment is granted in favor ofDKC.
The Court orders the parties to submit supplemental briefs, supported by expert affidavits,
addressing each defect/damage item (other than the ones already conceded) and indicate if each
such item should be classified as category 1,2 or 3. As noted, summary judgment will be
appropriate on Category 3 items. If experts differ on whether items fall within Category 3,
summary judgment would seem to be inappropriate on those items due to the presence of disputed
factual issues.
DKC's supplemental memorandum will be due on January 23,2015, and the remainder of the
briefing should be filed and served pursuant to rule 7 ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court will address the supplemental memoranda at a future summary judgment hearing.
The Court has reviewed both parties' proposed orders, and has created this one by combining
portions of both. All objections raised by both parties to the form of this order are, to the extent not
incorporated herein, OVERRULED.
-----------------------------------------END OF ORDER----------------------------------------------

January 29,201503:11 PM
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ADDENDUM 3: Order, Nov. 25, 2013

The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: November 25,2013
lsi Ryan.
11:44:17 AM
Distric

Prepared and Submitted by:
Jesse C. Trentadue (#4961)
Noah M. Hoagland (#11400)
Britton R. Butterfield (#13158)
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Facsimile: (801) 532-7355
jesse32@sautah.com
nhoagland@sautah.com
bbutterfield@sautah.com
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
Douglas Knight Construction, Inc.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH TOMLINSON, an individual,
and
AMY TOMLINSON, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUG KNIGHT CONSTRUCTION, a
Utah corporation; CLIVE
BRIDGEWATER an individual;
BRIDGEWATER CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., a Utah Corporation; and
JOHN DOES 1-10;

[Proposed] ORDERON KNIGHT
CONSTRUCTION, INC.'S THIRD
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
Civil No. 100500668
Judge Ryan Harris

Defendants.

November 25,201311:44 AM
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DOUG KNIGHT CONSTRUCTION, a
Utah Corporation;
Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.
AKITA CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
Corporation; HEARTH & HOME
DISTRIBUTORS OF UTAH, LLC, a
Utah Limited Liability Company, HIGH
MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah Corporation; JACK JOHNSON
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
PCF,INC. d/b/a PELLA WINDOWS
AND DOORS, a Utah Corporation;
PICTURE PERFECT STONE
MASONRY, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company; ROCKY
MOUNTAIN WATER PROOFING,
INC., a Utah Corporation; SCHULTZ
PLUMBING & HEATING, INC., a Utah
Corporation; SIGNATURE CONCRETE,
INC., a Utah Corporation; SUPERIOR
INSULATION CO., INC., a Utah
Corporation; THORNTON PLUMBING
& HEATING, INC., a Utah Corporation;
and U.S. DECK, INC., a California
Corporation;
Third-Party Defendants.

On October 31, 2013, the Court held a hearingon DefendantDoug Knight Construction,
Inc.' s ("Knight") Third Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Plaintiffwas represented by Joseph E. Wrona of Wrona Gordon & Dubois, P.C., and Defendant
2
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was represented by Noah M. Hoagland ofSuitter Axland, PLLC. VariousThird-Party
Defendants also appeared at the hearing through their counsel of record.
Based on the Motion and related filings, the arguments of counsel at hearing, and for
good cause, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
DKC's ThirdMotion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for
breach of the implied warranties of habitability and workmanlike manner.' This claim arises out
of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Davencourt at PilgrimsLandingHomeowners Assoc. v.

Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d 234, which enumerates the
following five elements: "1) the purchase of a new residence from a defendant buildervendor/developer-vender; 2) the residence contained a latent defect; 3) the defect manifested
itself after purchase; 4) the defect was causedby improper design, material, or workmanship; and
5) the defect created a question of safety or made the house unfit for human habitation." Id. p.
60.

DKC argues that Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action shouldbe dismissed becausePlaintiffs
cannotmeet the first element of the implied warranty claimbecauseDKC was neither a buildervender, nor a developer-vender. The Court agrees. The undisputed facts allegedin Plaintiffs'

ThirdAmended Complaint make clear that DKC is not a vendor. Indeed, Plaintiffs purchased
their home from DefendantOutpostDevelopment, Inc.
Based on the foregoing, DKC's ThirdMotion to Dismissand/orMotionfor Judgment on

the Pleadings is hereby grantedand Plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of the implied
1 DKC's Motion wasjoined by Third-Party Defendants SchultzPlumbing & Heating, Inc;
ThorntonPlumbing & Heating, Inc.; and ModernDamp ProofingInc, dba Rocky Mountain
Waterproofing.
3
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warranties of habitabilityand workmanlike manner is hereby DISMISSEDWITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this

day of November, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

HonorableRyan Harris
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Joseph E. Wrona, Esq.
Wrona Gordon & Dubois, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of November, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Proposed ORDER ON KNIGHT CONSTRUCTION, INC.'S THIRD
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS to

be served via United States mail, postage prepaid, and e-mail, upon the following:

Kumen L. Taylor, Esq.
Richard L. Wade, Esq.
Hurcmson & STEFFEN, LLC
Peccole Professional Park
10080Alta Drive, Suite 200
Las Vegas,NV 89145
Attorneysfor Akita Construction, Inc.

Joseph E. Wrona, Esq.
Bastiaan K. Coebergh, Esq.
Jarom B. Bangerter, Esq.
WRONA GORDON

&

DUBOIS, P.C.

1745 Sidewinder Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
Attorneysfor Plaintiff

Brett N. Anderson, Esq.

Barbara K. Berrett, Esq.
Michael A. Stahler,Esq.
BERRETT

&

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

ASSOCIATES, L.C.

405 South Main Street, Suite 1050
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneysfor RockyMountain Water Proofing,
Inc.

257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneysfor SuperiorInsulation Co., Inc.

JosephE. Minnock, Esq.
Anna Nelson, Esq.

Scott T. Evans, Esq.
Gabriel K. White, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN

MORGAN, MrNNOCK, RICE

15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneysfor Picture Perfect Stone
Masonry, LLC

Kearns Building,Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneysfor SchulzPlumbing
& Heating, Inc.

& JAMES, LC

5
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Robert L. Janicki, Esq.
STRONG

&

KevinE. Helm, Esq.
HELM

HANNI

&

ASSOCIATES

9350 South 150East, Suite 820
Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorneysfor Pella Windows & Doors

2810 West Charleston Blvd., Suite 0-67
Las Vegas, NY 89102
Attorneys for Thornton Plumbing & Heating,
Inc.

Julianne P. Blanch, Esq.
Scott C. Powers, Esq.

Signature Concrete, Inc.
c/o James C. Conway, President
5637 South700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

&

MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
SaltLake City, Utah 84145
Co-Counsel for Thornton Plumbing &
Heating, Inc.
U.S. Deck, Inc.
c/o Thomas Paul Zick, President
561 Wild WillowDrive
Kamas, Utah 84036

Jack Johnson Company
c/o Jack J. Johnson, Registered Agent
6400 Pace FrontageRoad, SuiteB
Park City, Utah 84098-6205

lsi Noah M. Hoagland
T:\7000\7647\5\KNIGHT PROPOSED ORDERRE DKC THIRD MTD Ver 2.wpd
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ADDENDUM 4: Assignment of Claims

MSIGmm~T QF CLtA1MS

~

THIS ASSrGNMENT OFCLAIMS (fIAsuigmnentH) is made and entered into as of th~
"'l~, day of Jantwy, 2lJ12 (the "Assig11ment Dater), 'by and between DavidA. Rosellbe1'& as
the duly appoin.ted Chtlpter 7 Trustee fOl' the bankruptcy eBtut~ of. debtor Outpost Development,
, InJJ" ("ASilignot') and Joseph and Amy Tomllnson (IiAaslgnees").
lmCI'rA1JS
Ii. WHEREAS, on Jmy 30, 2010, Assignees filed that celtmlllegal act1iJfi in t1\~ Third
Judicial DIstrlO't Court, Summit COU1ity, State of Utah, as Ca$~ No. 100500668 (th~
"Litigatio~ "),whel'ein Aasignees

have O&ttses ofaction agai1lSt, Outpost Oeve,lQpment
rnc.~ a Nevada oorporatlon C'Outpost"), Douglas Knight C911structio1t, Inc" a Utah
corpor.at1011 (14DKCIl ) , Bridgewater Consulting Group, Ino., a Ut~ corpor~tion
~jBC(flt), Wid Clive 13:ddgewateI', snindivld'tlal eBddgewMex"),
B. W.fI'B:RBAS, Outpost has certain ceuses ofaotion andolaims against DKC, BeG, and
Btldgewme.t (ool1ootl:vely th~ 44pefendautll') related to 'the Litigation !Utd have
Mse~'ted some Q1' 4ft QfthOjl:\} claimJ'l in the Litigation;

C. Wl-lmtEAS, on September 13, 2011, Outpost 1:11e<1. it~ volun:lary petiu.oJJ. fonelief
'tU1tW~1 Chapter 7 ofthe BankruptoV Code, Case No. :aK-S-l1"Z4S07-btb, whereby all
of Ot1tpo.~t' s elalms m~d oauses of'action became property ofthQ l:tmil.o:uptoy estate;

.

D. VlHBREAS, the Alisigtlees desire t.o acquh'e 'lJ.'OlU As$i~ot) and Assigt\.ol: desires to
assign, a:ny and all 01 Outpost's causes of action and claims Outpost :may havl;' ag!\iMt
the Def~dal'l.ts;
, NOW v l'HE,REFORE, in 0f.l1J~ldexatto1'l, ofthe ~nutufll1'l'o.m.i8es and oovenants co!\t\lJIJed
herein, ..and, other good and valuable .()onsiderf.!ti011, the recelpt and Eluffiolem,ly of whioh are
herebyaclu1owledged1 the pelrtles h~~'eto ag1'ee as follows:

1. 8t'lJ,sigpment. ASl:lign.d1' h.ereby aasign$, trattS£el'sl aud conveys to Assignees all of
Ou.tpost;!! tight tttle and interest in and to any and alll'ights, (llftM-na, causes of actio!" ehcees in
,actio11, 1,j'gl1U1 to'payment, and In.dgtnent,s (If !.Illy 1d11d th~t Outpost has asserted i11 the LitlgatioDt
may othenv.lfte assel't, agahlst the De±'en,oiUlts (the ~IClahuri~.

or

, 2. l1tr~.~riQe. Ausigl'l.ees he1'eby agree to pay the sum of Five Thb\IS~:l14 and Noll 00
Dollars ($5,000.00) to AElSig1101' 1'10 later than Febl'mrry. S, 2012~ and in dofn~ soAssignees accept
such ctalin::l.

" 005821~

IN Wn'NESS TFmRaO'~t 1hli vmiIell h(;)J.'tltll have ealls~d this Asa'l,gnrnlMl.t wbeexeeutefl
rotd f;lf~mtv~ as (It'thtl Aeai$.l1.ment Dnte,
ASS.tGNQR;
FlANKROnCYESTA'l"B OF OUT1l0tll,/,

DIW:aWPMlmT me,

•

j

.!
!

'.~~

.
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ADDENDUM 5: Order, June 3, 2015

,.

DISTRICT COURT OF THESTATE OFUTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY
JOSEPH TOMLINSON, an individual,
Plaintiff, .
vs.

ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS KNIGHT
CONSTRUCTION, INC.'SMOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST and FIFTH CAUSES

DOUGKNIGHT CONSTRUCTION, a
OF ACTION
Utah corporation; CLIVEBRIDGEWATER an
individual; BRIDGEWATER CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., a Utah Corporation; and JOHN CivilNo.1 00500668
JudgeRyanHarris
DOES 1-10;
Defendants,
DOUGKNIGHT CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
Corporation;
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v,

AKITACONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
Corporation, et al,
Third-Party Defendants.

On May 15, 2015,the Courtheld a regularly scheduled hearing on Douglas Knight
Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's First and Fifth Causes ofAction
and its Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment re: Waiver. DKC's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's First and Fifth Causes ofAction is fully dispositive of this case as this Court

previously dismissed Plaintiffs remaining causes of action against DKC. (See August 18,2014

June 03,2015 05:15 PM

Order Granting Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's ThirdCause ofAction; November 25,2013
Orderon KnightConstruction, Inc.

'09

ThirdMotion to Dismiss (dismissing Sixth Cause ofAction);

and December 2,2013 Order on KnightConstruction, Inc. 's SecondMotion to Dismiss(dismissing
Seventh and Eighth Causes ofAction». Plaintiffwas represented by Joseph Wrona, Bastiaan
Coebergh, and KendraBowers of'Wrona Gordon & Dubois; and Douglas Knight Construction, Inc.
("DKC")was represented by Noah M. Hoagland of Suitter Axland, PLLC.
The Courtheardoral arguments on DKC's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
First and Fifth Causes ofAction first. Based on the Motion andrelated filings, the record in this
case, the arguments of counsel at hearing, and for good cause shown, the Court herebyORDERS,
ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows:
This is a construction defectcase in whichPlaintiffJoe Tomlinson alleges problems at his
home in Park City, Utah (the"Home"). DKC wasthe general contractor that builtthe Home
pursuant to a Construction Agreement between Lot 84,LLC and DKC. (See Exhibit6 to Plaintiff's
Opposition to [DKC's] Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
First and Fifth Causes ofAction ("Plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum

"». Plaintiffalleges that Lot

84, LLC assigned its rights and obligations underthe Construction Agreement to developer Outpost
Development, Inc. ("Outpost"). Outpost then sold the Home to Plaintiff. Plaintiffsued both Outpost
and DKC, and Outpost brought a Cross-Claim against DKC, which essentially sought indemnity for
any liability that Outpost owedto Plaintiff. (See Exhibit 8 to Plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum).
Outpostthen filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed its "contingent" claim against DKC as a form
of personal property on its bankruptcy filings. (See Exhibit D to DKC's Memorandum). During
that Bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiffobtained a broadassignment of all of Outpost's rights to assert

June 03, 2015 05:15 PM
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both existing and potential causes of action against DKC that arise out of'Dls.C's construction of the
Home. (See Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum). Outpostwas laterdischarged from
bankruptcy on January 23, 2013. (See Exhibit H to DKC's supporting Memorandum). Plaintiff's
operative ThirdAmendedComplaint does not bring any causes of action against Outpost.
Plaintiff's First Cause ofAction, alleges breach of the Construction Agreement by DKC
because of the alleged construction defects at the Home. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause ofAction alleges
breach ofthe convent of good faith and fair dealing as a resultof the alleged construction defects,
(See Plaintiff's ThirdAmendedComplaint.) Plaintiffbrings these claims as the assignee of
Outpost's contract claims against DKC,
DKC argues that Plaintiff's First and Fifth Causes ofAction fail because Outpost suffered no
damages and therefore Plaintiff, as assignee of Outpost's claims, cannotmeetthe required elements
ofits contract claims, Bair v. AxiomDesign, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ~ 14,20 P.3d 388 ("The elements
of a prima facie casefor breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking
recovery, (3) breachof the contract by the otherparty, and (4) damages,"); Perry v. Pioneer
Wholesale Supply Co" 681 P,2d 214,218 (Utah 1984) (noting that "a causeof action for indemnity
does not ariseuntil the liability of the partyseeking indemnity results in damage, eitherthrough
payment of a sum clearly owed or through the injured party's obtaining an enforceable judgment."),
DKC reasons that Outpost filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy priorto everbecoming liable to
Plaintifffor the alleged construction defectclaims, and Outpost has suffered no other form of
damages. DKC citesSMEv. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 PJd
669, which heldthat an "assignee cannotrecover more thanthe assignor could recover; andthe
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor." Id.,

June 03,201505:15 PM
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16, SME further statedthanan
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assignee may not recoverthe damages it suffered as a result of a breach of the assigned contract.
Ratherthe assignee's recovery, if any, is limited to thosedamages the assignorsuffered as a result
of the breach. Id.,

~

30; see also Meadow Valley Conirs., Inc. v. State DOT, 2011 DT 35, 1 81,266

P.3d 671 (Durham, J., concurring) ("[A]n assignee not otherwise in privity of contract with an
obligor is constrained to pursuing damages its assignor suffered for claims its assignor couldhave
asserted against the obligor.").

Although the Court agrees that Plaintiffobtained a broad assignment of claims from Outpost
in the Nevadabankruptcy proceeding, an assignment that included all potential claims related to the
Home that Outpost may have had against DKC, Plaintiff's claims in this case-for construction
defects against DKC--are entirely dependent uponOutpost first beingfound liable to Plaintifffor
damages beforeOutpost would have an actionable "passthrough" claimagainst DKC. The
undisputed facts and procedural historyof this case establish that Outpostsuffered no liability 01'
damages because it filed for bankruptcy in 2011, andPlaintiffs claims againstOutpost were
discharged in bankruptcy. 11 USC § 727(b).
The Courtdetermines that the onlyremaining claims Plaintiffhas alleged against DKC in
this case are breach of contract claims for construction defects, and these claims are "pass through"
claims brought by Plaintiffas an assignee of Outpost's contract claims, As such,Plaintiffis in the
shoes of Outpost, and because Outpost has not, and cannot, sufferdamages, Plaintiff's claims fail as
a matterof law andthe CourtherebygrantsDKC's Motion/or Summary Judgment and dismisses
Plaintiffs First and Fifth Causes ofAction.
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: WAIVER

Basedon the Court's ruling 011 the First and Fifth Causes ofAction, the Court declined to
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hear oral argument on DKC's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment re: Waiver as that
Motion is now moot.
FINAL JUDGMENT FOR DKC

Becausethis Orderdisposes of all claims againstDKC in this matter, the Court hereby
enters finaljudgmentin favor ofDKC and certifies this Order as the entryof final judgmentunder
Utah Rule of CivilProcedure 54(b) as the Courtdetermines that there is nojust reason for delaying
the entry ofjudgment. The entry of this final judgmentcertainly does not preventPlaintifffrom
filing any motion to reconsider, but Plaintiffshould be aware that postjudgmentmotions to
reconsider do not toll the time for filing any appeal. See Gillettv. Price, 2006DT 24, P7, 135 P.3d
861.
DATED this 3rd day ofJune, 2015.
Approved as to form:

JosephE. Wrona, Esq.
Bastiaan K. Coebergh, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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